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Every day patients in need of effective treatment receive
substandard or fake drugs and other medical products.1 2At best
patients taking these compromised products get no relief from
their symptoms; at worst they may die. In poor countries, half
of medicines for some deadly diseases are fake and have little
or no active ingredient.3 In rich countries, medicine safety is
better, but substandard and falsified drugs still cause thousands
of adverse reactions and some deaths.4-6 As the outsourcing and
international trading of medicines becomes standard, patients
everywhere are vulnerable.4 5
In 2010, after years of debate,WHO’smember states established
a working group to decide how best to tackle this scandal, but
progress remains halting.7 The working group (now called the
member state mechanism) still cannot agree how to define the
various poor quality medicines, much less settle on any concrete
actions.
There are several reasons for this inadequate progress, yet all
are possible to overcome. In this article we—a diverse group
of authors from the health professions, health charities, legal
and medical academia, and former or current government
officials in health—outline the current challenges and propose
possible solutions.
Common interest
The most fundamental reason for current and past inaction is a
failure to recognise shared goals. Although drug companies,
non-governmental organisations, and governments all want
reliable access to safe and effective medicines and deplore
unsafe fake medicines, it is difficult to achieve agreement on
action because discussions too often trespass into conflict prone
areas such as pharmaceutical pricing or intellectual property.
For agreement to be achieved, care and restraint will be needed
to avoid these distracting arguments. One source of disagreement
is that anticounterfeiting laws in some countries give prominence
to the protection of commercial interests and pay little or no
attention to protecting public health interests.8 In East Africa,
poorly worded reforms to anticounterfeiting laws, supported by
some pharmaceutical companies, threatened to impede the
availability of generic medicines on which most ordinary
Africans depend.9 10 Likewise in Europe, customs authorities
seized legitimate generic AIDS and cancer medicines that were
in transit from India to Brazil because they infringed European
intellectual property and were ostensibly counterfeit.11 Rather
than promoting understanding and trust, these decisions
generated an understandable activist backlash because they
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endangered affordable access to medicines.8 If progress is to be
made, not only must such apparently provocative actions be
avoided, but the rush to controversy must be tempered by all
parties on all sides.
Clearer definitions
Such clashes are often caused by a second fundamental problem:
the absence of a clear, internationally agreed terminology to
define different sorts of legitimate or illegitimate medicines
(box 1).
Everyone agrees that there are two categories of legitimate
medicine on the market: proprietary medicines, which are
initially marketed under patent, and generic medicines, which
are lawful copies of the proprietary medicines either because
in a given country the patents have expired or were never granted
or because the manufacturer has a licence to use the patent.
Despite price differences, both proprietary and genericmedicines
are produced according to good manufacturing standards, are
properly regulated for quality, and can bear brands or
trademarks.
The situation and the terminology are far messier for illegitimate
medicines. In the past WHO distinguished between
“substandard” and “counterfeit” medicines, but last year member
states chose to lump them together in the new term
“substandard/spurious/falsely-labeled/falsified/counterfeit
medical products” (SSFFC).14However, placing all illegitimate
medicines under the SSFFC umbrella gives the misleading,
mistaken impression that they are all deficient in the same way,
when actually there are many possible deficiencies, each
requiring different solutions. We therefore propose new
definitions, which refine the views of WHOmember states (fig
1⇓).15
An important strength of the definitions that we propose is that
they do not draw on any intellectual property questions or use
the confusing word counterfeit. According to international
intellectual property law, a “counterfeit” medicine is one that
infringes a registered trademark by bearing an identical or near
identical mark.16Deliberate counterfeiting is a private economic
wrong, which can occur separately from or together with the
public health wrong of poor medicine quality. Thus it is a
mistake (but a common one) to use the adjective “counterfeit”
to refer to medicines that endanger public health. Accordingly
we avoid the term here.
“Substandard”medicines are those that for unintentional reasons
do not meet the legally required quality specifications of a
country’s regulators (usually a specialised medicine regulatory
authority). As noted elsewhere, substandard medicines have
various deficiencies and causes—for example, the raw
ingredients may be of poor quality, errors may occur in
manufacturing, or mishandling may cause the medicine to
degrade or expire.8 Each of these technical problems requires a
different solution.
“Unregistered” medicines are those that do not have the legally
required marketing authorisation of the country’s regulators to
be imported or sold there—for example, internationally diverted
or stolen medicines. Unregistered medicines can occur
unintentionally, but more often illicit diversion or theft implies
criminal intent to circumvent regulatory approval.
With both substandard and unregistered medicines, some aspect
of the medicine does not meet the regulator’s legal requirements.
Generally such products are also “falsely labelled” because they
deviate from the regulator’s approved packaging (expired
medicines, properly labelled with an end date, are the exception).
The final category is “falsified” medicines. Similar to
substandard medicines, the falsified medicines are unlawful in
violating the regulator’s quality specifications—but what truly
defines and distinguishes them is criminal intent. Thus it takes
more than a negligent breach of the regulator’s legal
requirements to make a medicine falsified; there must also be
a deliberate intent to deceive or wilful blindness. For example,
while an expired medicine is merely substandard, if the date is
altered to make it appear not expired, that deliberate fraudmakes
it falsified. Lawyers call this element of criminal intent mens
rea (guilty mind), and it signals to the justice system to prosecute
and punish instances of falsified medicines as serious crimes,
not just regulatory violations or civil negligence claims.
Surveillance and research
The third problem is that there is little reliable information on
the global scale of the falsified medicine problem.1 The UN
Office of Drugs and Crime implicates China and India as the
major exporters of “counterfeit” medicines, some of which are
doubtless also falsified, because both governments acknowledge
problems enforcing medicine quality laws.17-19 Case reports and
small scale studies document products containing the wrong
ingredients or bogus ingredients such as chalk, with the
deception disguised by sophisticated copies of the packaging
and holograms, or the cunning use of wrong ingredients that
mimic the proper active ingredient in analytical tests.3 20-22 These
studies leave no doubt that falsified medicines harm and
kill—sometimes hundreds of people at a time (box 2).
But how many incidents of falsified medicine are there, how
are they trafficked, and most importantly, how can the public
be better protected? More surveillance and research are needed
to answer these questions satisfactorily. WHO has estimated
that less than 1% of medicines in developed countries, rising to
over 10% in developing countries may be “counterfeit” (using
its overbroad definition of the term).27 Although an
underestimate, in 2009 the Pharmaceutical Security Institute
(an organisation set up by 24 drug companies in the 1990s)
detected about 2000 incidents of illegitimate medicines of all
kinds—five a day—in 118 countries and affecting 808 products
in nearly all therapeutic categories.28 In the European Union,
medicines are now the leading illegitimate product seized at the
border, increasing 700% from 2010 to 2011 (and the seizures
would be even higher, if the EU enforced more than just
intellectual property violations).29
The pharmaceutical industry, researchers, and governments
must better partner in acquiring, analysing and publicising
knowledge. The Pharmaceutical Security Institute maintains a
large database on various medicine crimes, but the industry
keeps nearly all the data secret, lest transparency should
undermine law enforcement efforts and deter patients from
consuming its products. Unfortunately, the industry’s secrecy
deprives researchers and governments of data that would help
raise public awareness of falsification, catalyse political action,
and thus improve patient safety. Some form of cooperation and
compromise must be reached, whereby secrecy is protected
during police investigations but biomedical and criminological
researchers gain access soon after.7 Just as clinical trial registries
have begun to make the industry’s once secret trial data more
available, more transparency of the industry’s medicine crime
data is possible.
Avoid conflating issues
The fourth problem is the mistaken tendency to conflate quality
of medicines with tangential concerns such as intellectual
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Box 1 Some definitions of illegitimate medicines and their problems
WHO notes that consensus has not been reached on the definitions.12 As these examples show, current definitions are often imprecise (not
separating unintentional from intentional crimes) or overbroad (conflating public health and intellectual property violations).
1992 WHO definition (no longer used)
“A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can
apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong
ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredient or with fake packaging.”12
This definition of counterfeit is restricted to deliberate fraud. However, it does not separate public health violations (wrong or insufficient
ingredients) from intellectual property violations (fake packaging) and considers both wrongful.
Council of Europe’s Medicrime Convention
Article 4(j) reads, “the term ‘counterfeit’ shall mean a false representation as regards identity and/or source.”13
The Council of Europe’s definition of counterfeit is not limited to deliberate misrepresentations, so it may also criminalise errors that have
occurred unintentionally during manufacturing.11
India’s Drug And Cosmetics Act 1940
Section 9B reads, “A drug shall be deemed to be spurious: (a) if it is imported under a name which belongs to another drug; or (b) if it is an
imitation of, or a substitute for, another drug or resembles another drug in a manner likely to deceive or bears upon it or upon its label or
container the name of another drug unless it is plainly and conspicuously marked so as to reveal its true character and its lack of identity
with such other drug; or (c) if the label or the container bears the name of an individual or company purporting to be the manufacturer of the
drug, which individual or company is fictitious or does not exist; or (d) if it has been substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance;
or (e) if it purports to be the product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a product.”
India’s definition of “spurious” drugs does not separate public health violations (subsection d) from intellectual property violations (subsections
a, b, and e). It also is not limited to deliberate fraud.
Box 2: Examples of dangerously compromised medicines in 2011-12
Substandard heart medicine
More than 125 people died in Pakistan of bone marrow suppression after a public cardiology pharmacy provided generic
isosorbide-5-mononitrate tablets adulterated with a toxic overdose of pyrimethamine, an antimalarial drug. The substandard product was
the result of a manufacturing error, although police allege that company officials learnt of the error and sold the medicine anyway.23 If the
allegation proves true, the medicine would be reclassified as falsified.
Falsified antiretrovirals
In Kenya, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) unintentionally provided patients with falsified tablets of zidovudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine
that criminals had inserted into its supply chain.24 The falsified product mimicked the appearance of a generic antiretroviral, but tablets were
“in varying degrees of deterioration, ie moulding, discolouration.”25 Once the problem was discovered, MSF followed-up about 3000 patients
with proper medicines and counselling.
Falsified cancer medicine
Authorities globally are combating falsified bevacizumab of unknown origin. The falsified product closely matches the appearance of the
real medicine, but tests indicate that it contains starch and acetone instead of active ingredient.26 The fakes were trafficked on a complex
supply chain, through Turkey, Switzerland, and Denmark to US, in part by a Canadian firm and its offshore affiliates. The extent of harm to
patients is unknown.
property rights.30 The confusion arises because pharmaceutical
companies sometimes enforce their intellectual property to force
counterfeited copies of their products off the market, some of
which may also be falsified. (This is why we recommend
reserving the term “counterfeit” for private trademark violations
and “falsified” for public health crimes.)
Arguments by some non-governmental organisations that “the
high price of pharmaceuticals” causes falsification or that lower
prices would “eliminate the incentive for the business” are also
based on mistaken conflation.31 32 Such arguments fail to
recognise that any legitimate medicine, regardless of price, can
be produced more cheaply and profitably by criminals using
fake instead of real ingredients. Thus falsification occurs not
just in expensive proprietary medicines but also the cheapest
generic medicines, including those on the WHO model list of
essential medicines that cost only pennies (for example,
ampicillin, chloroquine, or tetracycline).33 34 Worryingly,
medicines on WHO’s essential list may be especially attractive
to falsify because there is a huge global demand and because
most are unpatented, meaning criminals face no risk from angry
patent holders suing or demanding prosecution. Even basic
generics can be falsified with tragic results—for example
falsified paracetamol syrup has killed hundreds (mostly children)
in Bangladesh, Haiti, India, and elsewhere.35 Like most crime,
falsification is opportunistic, occurring where regulatory
defences are lowest, not necessarily where profits are highest.
Using international law
We argue that tackling the challenges of poor quality, unsafe
medicines requires a comprehensive global strategy on which
all stakeholders agree. Both falsified and substandard medicines
endanger public health, but their countermeasures are different.8
A new global treaty could tackle them simultaneously and
synergistically through legal, technical, and financial measures
(fig 2⇓).
The governance of the global medicine trade currently suffers
from a dangerous imbalance: international trade laws force open
countries’ markets to imported medicines and pharmaceutical
ingredients, but no complementary international health laws
defend countries from trafficked products of dangerously bad
quality. Purely technical initiatives are not sufficient to safeguard
quality because they are not legally binding (box 3). A binding
international law on drug quality—that is, a treaty—is needed
to complement the existing trade treaties and put public health
on an equal plane.
Currently, the biggest problem with the governance of falsified
medicines is that they are legal in global trade.40 Responsible
governments can and do prohibit falsified medicines under
national law but remain vulnerable to organised criminals doing
business in “haven” countries (both rich and poor) where laws
or enforcement are lax—30% of countries have little or no
medicine regulation according toWHO. In other contexts global
treaties have helped governments strengthen their laws and
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Box 3: Some global initiatives against dangerously compromised medicines
Pharmacopoeias—WHO publishes the International Pharmacopoeia, comprising technical specifications and testing methods for
medicines and their ingredients.36 WHO monographs, as well as those of national pharmacopoeias, are often cited in national drug
regulation laws as legally binding standards
Police operations—Interpol coordinates national police forces in drug seizure and arrest operations, including Operation Pangea, targeting
medicines sold illegally on the internet.37 Some credit card companies, internet search companies, and domain registrars are informally
supporting these efforts
Regulatory harmonisation—The International Conference on Harmonisation strives to set uniform technical standards for registering
and regulating medicines in most developed countries.38 Similar efforts are nascent in some developing regions, such as the East African
Community’s medicines registration harmonisation initiative
Pharmacovigilance—AlthoughWHO has a mandate to advise countries in recording adverse events of medicines and to publish medicine
alerts, member states seldom report events to WHO. Data collection at the global level therefore remains sporadic and unreliable1
Verifiable serialisation (track and trace)—Various countries mandate that medicine packages bear unique serial numbers that can be
electronically verified at point of sale. However, lack of agreement on an internationally accepted technology or data standards risks
making country by country compliance hard and costly
Prequalification—Because of the special political will surrounding HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, WHO screens manufacturers of
medicines for these diseases in a voluntary prequalification scheme.39 WHO reviews drug dossiers, inspects sites, and provides advice
and training. Nearly 300 medicines are currently WHO prequalified
cooperate internationally to clamp down on the havens—for
example, on human trafficking or money laundering. The lack
of a treaty means there is generally no agreement on which
medicines are wrongful or criminal; no requirement for police
to cooperate across borders in carrying out international
investigations; and no requirement for prosecutors to share
evidence or to respond to extradition requests to bring
perpetrators to justice.40 These omissions translate into impunity
for medicine criminals.
A successful treaty would deal with both falsified and
substandard medicines but treat them differently. Using our
definitions, falsified medicines are deliberate, intentional frauds
and should be prohibited using criminal measures. In contrast,
substandard medicines are unintentional or negligent errors that
require regulatorymeasures to correct. The “positive” regulatory
agenda and the “negative” criminal agenda are synergistic, as
in other policy contexts (for example, food is regulated for
safety, but adulterating food is a crime). Both agendas depend
primarily on national medicine regulatory authorities, with
ancillary support from customs, police, justice ministries, and
frontline healthcare workers. As well as setting norms and
expectations for governments, a treaty could raise new money
through a dedicated financial mechanism to help needy countries
build regulatory capacity for medicines, assuring quality
manufacturing and training healthcare workers.
Thus the growing political energy to fight falsified medicines
could, if wisely channelled into a treaty that also includes
substandard medicines, provide new financing and reinforced
capabilities against both dangers.
Action plan towards a global treaty
The treaty would need to fulfil five functions:
• Define legally the different types of illegitimate medicines,
possibly using the terms we propose, so as to avoid
confusion and unwelcome over-reaches against legitimate
medicines
• Define new public health crimes in international law, such
as to manufacture, traffic, or sell falsified medicines
• Mandate intergovernmental cooperation so that countries
report, investigate, and prosecute transborder crimes and
seize criminals’ assets
• Create an ongoing intergovernmental forum to protect the
legitimate medicines trade, such as by setting global
standards for authenticating medicines with tracking and
tracing technologies or by setting standards for medicine
sales on the internet
• Include administrative provisions, particularly to give
financial and technical assistance to strengthen medicine
regulatory authorities in poorer countries.
Other consensus building exercises have identified many of the
same elements,41 and conveniently, these elements have
precedents in other treaties. A 1929 treaty to criminalise
counterfeit banknotes internationally provides an obvious
analogy for falsified medicine.42 This month a new protocol
under today’s leading public health treaty, the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) will legally mandate
global tracking and tracing for tobacco products and
internationally criminalise illicit trade—oddly making the law
tougher on cigarette falsification than on medicine falsification.
The FCTC also shows that treaties can raise new financial
resources: nearly $250m (£155m; €190m) is now spent annually
on global tobacco control.43 More dramatic examples exist in
various environmental treaties, through which the Global
Environment Facility has raised over $50bn in foreign aid
directly and in co-funding.44 These and other successful
precedents are adaptable for medicines.
What are the reasonable next steps? WHO’s member states
should ask WHO staff to embark on a similar process to that
which created the FCTC, which began with a technical working
group and led to formal negotiations among diplomats in an
international negotiating body. That project should have the
limits we describe here, such as excluding work related to
intellectual property, and should involve other international
organisations when matters exceed WHO’s public health
mandate (for example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime is
better suited to law enforcement than WHO). To build the
political case and will for action, the pharmaceutical industry
and Pharmaceutical Security Institute should cooperate with
independent researchers on studies that generate knowledge and
raise awareness about the scale and provenance of illegitimate
medicines. This starting framework, we believe, avoids
unnecessary controversy and can better enable governments,
companies, advocates, and the health professions to protect the
public’s health.
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Figures
Fig 1 Categories of legitimate and illegitimate medicine
Fig 2 Elements of a treaty to improve the safety of medicines. The figure shows the linkages between treaty elements
(green), directly supported actions (red), and supporting information exchanges (orange)
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